





tored value cards look like credit cards but are capable of storing mon-
etary value. There are a number of stored value card systems being
developed in the United States, and some have already been implemented
in Europe and elsewhere. Stored value cards are particularly well-suited for
transactions that would otherwise be carried out with currency and thus are a
private substitute for government ﬁat money, like private bank notes. Unlike
bank notes, however, stored value cards employ new technologies that are quite
different from, and potentially more costly than, the coins and paper currency
they are aimed at replacing. This article explores the basic welfare economics
of costly private substitutes for government currency, an important class of
payments system innovations.1
Consumers and merchants are likely to beneﬁt from the introduction of
stored value cards. Many might prefer to avoid the inconvenience and cost
of handling paper currency. The usual presumption, in the absence of market
imperfection, is that a successful new product must provide social beneﬁts
in excess of social costs. Issuers will attempt to cover their costs and earn
a competitive return while providing consumers and merchants with a means
of payment they prefer. They can do so if consumers and merchants are col-
lectively willing to pay enough, either directly or indirectly, to remunerate
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issuers for the opportunity cost of the inputs devoted to the alternative means
of payment. If stored value thrives, standard reasoning suggests that it must be
because the value to consumers and merchants exceeds the cost of provision.
The fact that stored value is a monetary asset provides further reason to
believe that it will be beneﬁcial. Currency is subject to an implicit tax due to
inﬂation, which reduces its rate of return relative to other risk-free nominal
assets. Like any other (non-lump-sum) tax, the inﬂation tax distorts economic
decisions, giving rise to deadweight costs as people try to economize on the
use of currency. Private substitutes for currency provide a means of avoiding
the seigniorage tax, alleviating the deadweight loss associated with any given
inﬂation rate. Stored value cards can increase economic welfare by easing the
burden of inﬂation.
Stored value cards could be socially wasteful, however. Stored value lia-
bilities compete with an asset, currency, that pays no interest, while issuers are
free to invest in interest-earning assets. Thus one portion of the return to stored
value issuers is the spread between market interest rates and the rate of return
on currency. This return far exceeds the government’s cost of producing and
maintaining the supply of currency—less than two-tenths of a cent per year per
dollar of currency outstanding.2 At current interest rates the private incentive
to provide stored value exceeds the social cost of the currency replaced by as
much as 4 or 5 cents per dollar. Thus stored value cards, if successful, will
replace virtually costless government currency with a substitute that could cost
substantially more.
This article presents a model in which both currency and stored value
are used to make payments. Stored value cards are provided by a competitive
intermediary sector and are used in transactions for which the cost of stored
value is less than the ﬂoat cost associated with using currency. Conditions are
identiﬁed under which the equilibrium allocation of the economy with stored
value cards does or does not Pareto-dominate that of an otherwise identical
economy without stored value cards. The critical condition is a boundary on
the average cost of stored value: stored value is beneﬁcial or harmful depending
upon whether, other things equal, average cost is below or above a certain cut-
off. If average cost is low, the reduction in the deadweight loss due to inﬂation
will be large and the resource cost will be low. If average cost is high, the
resource diversion will be large and there will be little effect on the burden of
inﬂation.
The fact that costly private substitutes for government ﬁat money can re-
duce welfare was demonstrated by Schreft (1992a), and the model presented
below is an extension of hers. This fact should not be surprising—as I argue
below, we should expect the same result in any model with multiple means of
2 See the appendix for documentation.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 3
payments.3 The interest foregone by holding currency is an opportunity cost
to private agents, and they are willing to incur real resource costs to avoid
it. The resource cost of a money substitute is a social cost, while the interest
cost associated with currency is not. Thus the private incentive to provide a
substitute for government currency is greater than the social beneﬁt, a point
stressed by Wallace (1986). He has argued that a positive nominal interest rate
provides a similar incentive to issue private banknotes (Wallace 1983). While
banknotes employ virtually the same technology as government currency, stored
value employs a very different technology but serves the same role—both are
private substitutes for government currency.
The best policy in the model is one in which the nominal interest rate is
zero—the Friedman rule for the optimum quantity of money (Friedman 1969).
For a given positive nominal interest rate, however, Schreft (1992a) has shown
that quantitative restrictions on the use of credit as a means of payment can
improve welfare. The same is true for stored value as well, since stored value
is just another form of credit as a means of payment; if nominal interest rates
are positive, then the right kind of quantitative constraints on stored value
cards, if practical, can improve welfare by preventing the most wasteful uses.
A non-interest-earning reserve requirement on stored value liabilities is inferior
to quantitative constraints because it imposes an inframarginal tax on users of
stored value.
No attention is paid here to consumer protection or to the safety and
soundness of bank stored value activities (see Blinder [1995] and Laster and
Wenninger [1995]). The analysis presumes that stored value systems provide
relatively fraud- and counterfeit-proof instruments. Historical instances of pri-
vate issue of small-denomination bearer liabilities, such as the early nineteenth
century U.S. “free banking” era, have raised concerns about fraudulent note
issue (see Friedman [1960]). Williamson (1992) shows that a government
monopoly in issuing circulating media of exchange may be preferable to laissez-
faire private note issue due to asymmetric information about bank portfolios.
Others argue that a system of private banknote issue can function rather well:
see Rolnick and Weber (1983, 1984). In any case, current communications tech-
nologies and regulatory and legal restraints are quite different from those of the
early nineteenth century. Whether the concerns of Friedman and Williamson are
relevant to stored value cards is beyond the scope of this article; the focus here
is the implication of the seigniorage tax for the private incentives to provide
currency substitutes.
3 For models of multiple means of payment see Prescott (1987), Schreft (1992a, 1992b),
Marquis and Reffett (1992, 1994), Ireland (1994), Dotsey and Ireland (1995), English (1996),
and Lacker and Schreft (1996).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1. STORED VALUE CARDS
Stored value cards—sometimes called “smart cards”—contain an embedded mi-
croprocessor and function much like currency for a consumer. Value is loaded
onto a card at a bank branch, an automated teller machine (ATM), or at home
through a telephone or computer hookup with a bank. Customers pay for the
value loaded onto the card either by withdrawing funds from a deposit account
or by inserting currency into a machine. Customers spend value by sliding
it through a merchant’s card reader, which reduces the card’s balance by the
amount of the purchase and adds it to the balance on the merchant’s machine.
Merchants redeem value at the end of the day through a clearing arrangement
similar to those used for “off-line” credit card or ATM transactions. The mer-
chant dials up the network and sends in the stored value, which is then credited
to the merchant’s bank account. More elaborate systems allow consumers to
transfer value from card to card.
The value on a stored value card is a privately issued bearer liability.
It is different from a check because the merchant does not bear the risk of
insufﬁcient funds in the buyer’s account. It is different from a debit card in
that the consumer hands over funds upon obtaining the stored value, while a
debit card leaves the funds in the consumer’s account until the transaction is
cleared. Thus a debit card is a device for authorizing deposit account transfers,
while a stored value card records past transfers.
For consumers, stored value cards can be more convenient than currency
in many settings; some consumers are likely to ﬁnd cards physically easier
to handle than coins and paper notes. The technology could conceivably al-
low consumers to load value onto their cards using a device attached to their
home computer, saving the classic “shoe leather” cost of bank transactions.
For merchants, stored value cards offer many of the advantages of credit card
sales. The merchant saves the trouble of handling coins and notes (banks often
charge fees for merchant withdrawals and deposits of currency) and avoids
the risk of employee theft. Stored value improves on the mechanisms used
for credit and debit cards, however, because the merchant’s device veriﬁes the
validity of the card, without costly and time-consuming on-line authorization.
Thus stored value cards extend the electronic payments technology of credit
card transactions to more time-sensitive settings where on-line authorization is
prohibitive.
2. A MODEL OF CURRENCY AND STORED VALUE
This section describes a model in which stored value and currency both circu-
late in equilibrium. Monetary assets are useful in this model because agents are
spatially separated and communication is costly. In the absence of stored value,
agents use currency whenever shopping away from home, and the structure ofJ. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 5
the model is reduced to a simple cash-in-advance framework. Stored value is a
costly private substitute for currency, similar to costly trade credit in Schreft’s
(1992a, 1992b) models.
The model is a deterministic, discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon environment
with a large number of locations and goods but no capital. At each location there
are a large number of identical households endowed with time and a technology
for producing a location-speciﬁc good. Each period has two stages. The ﬁrst
takes place before production and, in principle, allows any agent to trade any
contingent claim with any other agent. During the second stage, production and
exchange take place. One member of the household—the “shopper”—travels
to other locations to acquire consumption goods. Simultaneously, the other
member of the household—the “merchant”—produces location-speciﬁc goods
and sells them to shoppers from other locations. Shoppers are unable to bring
with them goods produced in their own location, so direct barter is infeasible.
The fundamental friction in this environment is that it is prohibitively
costly for agents from two different locations to verify each other’s identities.
As a result, intertemporal exchange between agents from different locations
is impossible, or, more precisely, not incentive compatible. Meetings between
shoppers and merchants away from home thus effectively resemble the anony-
mous meetings of the Kiyotaki-Wright (1989) model. This provides a role for
valued ﬁat currency. Because agents from the same location are known to
each other, households can exchange arbitrary contingent claims with other
households at the same location during the “securities market” in the ﬁrst stage
of each period. Households could travel to other locations during the securities
market, but anonymity prevents meaningful exchange of intertemporal claims.
The stored value technology is a costly way of overcoming this friction.
There are a large number of agents that are veriﬁably known to all—call them
“issuers.” They are price-takers and thus earn a competitive rate of return.
Like all other agents they can travel to any other location during the securities
market, but since their identities are known, they are able to issue enforceable
claims. The claim people want to buy is one they can use in exchange in the
goods market. The difﬁculty facing such an arrangement, however, is authen-
ticating the claim to the merchant—in other words, the difﬁculty of providing
the shopper with a means of communicating the earlier surrender of value.
Issuers possess the technology for creating message-storage devices—“stored
value cards”—that shoppers can carry and machines that can read and write
messages on these devices. Issuers offer to install machines with merchants.
These machines can read, verify, and write messages on shoppers’ cards and
can record and store messages.
In principle the stored value technology described here could be conﬁg-
ured to communicate any arbitrary messages. In this setting, however, a very
simple message space will sufﬁce. The shopper’s device carries a measure of6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
monetary value, and the merchant’s device deducts the purchase price from the
number on the shopper’s card and adds it to the measure of value stored on
the merchant’s device. During the next day’s securities market, the issuer visits
the merchant and veriﬁes the amount stored on the reader. The issuer sells
stored value to households in securities markets and then redeems stored value
from merchants during the next day’s securities markets. Messages in this case
function much like the tokens in Townsend’s (1986, 1987, 1989) models of
limited communication. From this perspective, currency and stored value can
be seen as alternative communications mechanisms.
I will adopt a very simple assumption concerning the cost of the stored
value technology. I will assume that the card-reader devices that merchants
use are costless to produce but require maintenance each period and that only
issuers have the expertise to perform this maintenance. The amount of main-
tenance required depends on the location in which the device is installed and
is proportional to the real value of the transactions that were recorded on the
device. Some locations are more suited to stored value systems than others. This
assumption will allow stored value and currency to coexist in equilibrium, with
currency used at the locations that are less well-suited for stored value. The
proportionality of costs to value processed might reﬂect security measures or
losses due to fraud that rise in proportion to the value of transactions. I make
no effort to model such phenomena explicitly but merely take the posited cost
function as given. There are no other direct resource costs. In particular, stored
value cards themselves are costless.4
The stored value cost function here is quite simple and in many respects
somewhat unrealistic. Merchants’ devices and the communications networks
used to “clear” stored value are, arguably, capital goods and should be repre-
sented as investment expenditures rather than input costs. I am abstracting from
capital inputs here, but this seems appropriate in a model with no capital goods
to begin with.5 Another feature of my cost function is that cost is proportional to
the value of the transaction. In practice, the resource cost of electronic storage
and transmission might not vary much with the numerical value of the message:
transmitting “ten” should not be much cheaper than transmitting “ten thousand.”
Thus it seems plausible that a communications system, once built, would be
4 Indirect evidence suggests that the resource costs of stored value systems could be sub-
stantial. A variety of sources indicate that bank operating expenses associated with credit cards
amount to around 3 or 4 percent of the value of credit card charge volume. This does not include
the direct expenses of merchants such as the costs of card readers. Stored value systems may
avoid some expenses such as the costs associated with credit card billing and the cost of on-line
communications. On the other hand, the cost of stored value cards themselves are greater than
the cost of traditional “magnetic strip” cards.
5 See Ireland (1994), Marquis and Reffett (1992, 1994), and English (1996) for models with
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equally capable of carrying large and small value messages.6 The cost function
I adopt is the simplest one that is sufﬁcient to demonstrate the claim that the
introduction of stored value cards can reduce economic welfare. One critical
feature is that the relative opportunity costs of stored value and currency vary
across transactions so that both potentially circulate in equilibrium. A second
critical feature is that there are constant returns to scale in providing stored
value at any given location so that competition among providers is feasible. It
should become clear as I proceed that the results are likely to carry over to
settings with more elaborate cost functions.
The assumed technology also implies that the choice between currency
and stored value takes a particularly simple form. The cost of using currency
is the interest foregone while it is in use. The cost of stored value is simply
the resource cost described above. By assuming that government currency is
costless, I am abstracting from many of the factors mentioned in the previous
section such as physical convenience, currency handling costs, and employee
theft. Costless currency simpliﬁes the presentation without loss of generality.
In the appendix I describe a model in which there are private costs of handling
currency and show that Proposition 1 below still holds. One could also modify
the model to include government currency costs, as in Lacker (1993). The
appendix also contains a model in which stored value substitutes for other
more costly means of payment such as checks or credit cards; Proposition 1
holds in that model as well.
I can now begin describing the model more formally.7
Households
Time is indexed by t ≥ 0, and locations are indexed by z and h, where z,h ∈
[0,1). For a typical household at location h ∈ [0,1), consumption of good z
at time t is given by ct(h,z), and labor effort is given by nt(h). Households
are endowed with one unit of time that can be devoted to labor or leisure.
The production technology requires one unit of labor to produce one unit of
consumption good. Household preferences are
∞ X
t=0
βtu(ct(h),1 − nt(h)), ct(h) = infz ct(h,z), (1)
6 Ireland (1994) studies a similar model in which cost is independent of the value of the
transaction. Also see Prescott (1987) and English (1996). For a partial equilibrium model see
Whitesell (1992).
7 The model is most closely patterned after the environment in Schreft (1992a) and Lacker
and Schreft (1996). The main difference is that here the alternative payments medium is used at
a subset of locations by all shoppers visiting that location, rather than at all locations but by only
a subset of shoppers visiting that location. Also, I allow a general cost function while Schreft’s
cost function is, for convenience, linear in distance.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where u is strictly concave and twice differentiable. Household preferences are
thus Leontieff across goods. This assumption implies that the composition of
consumption is unaffected by the relative transaction costs at different locations,
which considerably simpliﬁes matters. In addition, it implies that transaction
costs at a given location are passed on entirely to shoppers, since demand
at a given location is inelastic.8 Since all goods will bear a positive price in
equilibrium, we can assume without loss of generality that ct(h,z) = ct(h) for
all z.
In the securities market households acquire both currency and stored value.
Since the units in which value is stored are arbitrary, there is no loss in gen-
erality in assuming that stored value is measured in units of currency. Thus
one dollar buys one unit of stored value. Let cm
t (h,z) and cs
t(h,z) denote the
consumption of good z at time t purchased with currency and stored value,
respectively. Let mt(h) and st(h) be the amount of currency and stored value















where pt is the price of goods for currency and ps
t(z) is the price of goods for
stored value at location z.9
Household h sells ym
t (h) units of output for currency and ys
t(h) units of
output for stored value. In addition, they sell yi
t(h) units of output to issuers.
Since issuers are well known, merchants are willing to sell to them on credit
and accept payment in next period’s securities market. Feasibility requires
ym
t (h) + ys
t(h) + yi
t(h) ≤ nt(h). (4)
At the end of the period, the household has ps
t(h)ys
t(h) units of stored value on
their card reader to be redeemed at t + 1. Issuers pay interest at the nominal
rate it, the market rate on one-period bonds, but deduct a proportional charge
at rate rt(h) from the proceeds to cover their costs. Thus the household receives
8 Allowing substitution between goods would imply that the composition of consumption
varies with changes in relative transaction costs. Relative prices net of transaction costs would
then vary across locations, destroying the symmetry in households’ consumption and leisure
choices. See Ireland (1994) and Dotsey and Ireland (1995) for models which relax the Leontieff
assumption.
9 In principle the price of goods for currency could vary across locations as well, but sym-
metry will ensure equality across locations. This is conﬁrmed below: see (12). Note that shoppers
do not receive explicit interest on stored value. Note also that I allow merchants to charge a
different price for different payments instruments.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 9
[1− rt(h)](1 + it)ps
t(h)ys
t(h) units of currency at t + 1 for the stored value they
have accepted.10
Households bring the following to the securities market: currency from the
previous period’s sales, stored value to be redeemed, maturing bonds, and any
currency that might be left over from shopping in the previous period. Letting
bt be bond purchases at t, and τt be lump-sum taxes at t, households face the
following budget constraint at time t + 1:












t(h,z)dz + (1 + it)bt + pt[ym
t (h) + yi
t(h)]
+ [1 − rt(h)](1 + it)ps
t(h)ys
t(h). (5)
Households maximize (1) subject to (2) through (5) and the relevant nonnega-
tivity constraints, taking prices and interest rates as given.
Issuers
There are a large number of issuers at location zero, distinct from the house-
holds described above. Their preferences depend on their consumption [ci
t(z)]









Issuers sell st(z) units of stored value per capita in securities market z at time
t in exchange for st(z) units of currency and redeem s0
t(z) units of stored
value per capita from merchants at market z at time t + 1 in exchange for
[1− rt(z)](1 + it)s0
t(z) units of currency. All of the stored value they issue will
be spent by households and then redeemed from card readers in equilibrium,










Maintenance of the devices on which the stored value at location z is redeemed
requires γ(z)s0
t(z)/ps
t(z) units of labor effort, where γ(z) is a continuous, strictly









10 Note that the payment could be thought of as redemption at par plus a premium
[1 − rt(h)](1 + it) − 1. The form of merchants’ payments to issuers depends on issuers’ cost
functions. The payment is proportional to the value redeemed because the issuers’ costs are
proportional to value redeemed. If costs were independent of value redeemed, the equilibrium
payment would also be independent of value redeemed.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The alternative for issuers who are not active is to consume nothing [ci
t(z) =
ni
t = 0], which can be interpreted as the proceeds of some alternative autarchic
activity.
The family of an issuer consists of a worker and a shopper. The worker
manages the stored value business, while the shopper travels around during
the goods market period purchasing consumption. Since issuers are known to
all, the shopper can buy on credit, paying ptci
t(z) in the location-z securities
market at t + 1 for goods purchased there at t. Excess funds are invested in
bond holdings bi












(1 + it)[1 − rt(z)]s0
t(z)dz. (9)
Active issuers maximize (6), subject to (7) through (9) and the relevant non-
negativity constraints, by choosing consumption, bonds, labor effort, and the
amount of stored value to issue and redeem at each location. Because there are
a large number of issuers, competition between them will drive the utility of
active issuers down to the reservation utility associated with inactivity. Issuers
initially have no assets.
Government
The government issues ﬁat money Mt and one-period bonds Bt, collects lump-
sum taxes Tt, and satisﬁes
Mt+1 + Bt+1 = Mt + (1 + it)Bt − Tt+1 (10)
for all t. The government sets a constant money growth rate π = Mt+1/Mt −1,
where π ≥ β − 1.
Equilibrium
A symmetric monetary equilibrium consists of sequences of prices, quantities
and initial conditions M−1 and (1+i−1)B−1, such that households and issuers
optimize, the lifetime utility of active issuers is equal to the lifetime utility
of inactive issuers starting at any date, the government budget constraint (10)




all t and z. I restrict attention to stationary equilibria, in which real magnitudes
are constant over time. Where possible, time subscripts will be dropped from
variables that are constant over time; variables refer to date t quantities unless
otherwise noted.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the issuer’s maximization problem
imply
r(z)(1 + i) = γ(z)pt/ps
t(z). (11)J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 11
The left side of (11) is the nominal net return from issuing one dollar’s worth
of stored value at t to be redeemed at location z at t + 1, with the proceeds
invested in a bond maturing at t + 1. Interest on the bond is paid over to the
merchant, with a portion r(z) of the payment deducted as a fee. The right side
of (11) is the nominal cost of enough consumption goods to compensate the
issuer for the disutility of maintaining the stored value device at location z.
Thus condition (11) states that for stored value issuers marginal net revenue
equals marginal cost at each location.
Merchants consider whether to sell output for currency or for stored value.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the household’s maximization problem
imply that if merchants are indifferent between accepting currency and stored
value, then
pt = [1 − r(z)](1 + i)ps
t(z). (12)
As a result, the last two terms in the household’s budget constraint (5) simplify
to ptn(h). Households at all locations face identical terms of trade between
consumption and leisure despite the difference in transaction costs across lo-
cations. Consumption and labor supply are therefore identical across locations
and the notation for h can be suppressed.
When shoppers consider whether to use currency or stored value to pur-
chase consumption at location z, they compare the unit cost of the former, pt,
to the unit cost of the latter, ps
t(z). Using (11) and (12), shoppers use stored
value if
pt > ps
t(z) = pt[1 + γ(z)]/(1 + i). (13)
Thus stored value is used where γ(z) < i. Because γ is strictly increasing, the
boundary between the stored value and the currency locations can be written
as a function ζ(i) ≡ γ−1(i). Stored value will coexist with currency as long
as i is less than γ(1), the cost of stored value at the highest cost location. If
i ≥ γ(1), then stored value drives out currency; in this case ζ(i) is one.




γ(z)dz ≡ Γ(i). (14)
Steady-state equilibrium values of c and n can be found as the solutions to the
ﬁrst-order condition
u1(c,1 − n)/u2(c,1 − n) = 1 + [1 − ζ(i)]i + Γ(i), (15)
along with the feasibility condition
n = c[1 + Γ(i)]. (16)12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
For a given nonnegative nominal interest rate, consumption and employment
are determined by (15) and (16).11 Assuming that neither leisure nor consump-
tion are inferior goods, then v(c,1−n) ≡ u1(c,1−n)/u2(c,1−n) is decreasing
in c and increasing in 1 − n. If in addition we assume that v(c,1 − n) goes to
inﬁnity as c goes to zero and zero as 1−n goes to zero, then we are guaranteed
an interior solution; the proof appears in the appendix. The real interest rate is
β−1 − 1 in all equilibria, and the inﬂation rate is β(1 + i) − 1.
Without stored value cards the economy has the same basic structure as a
standard cash-in-advance model (Lucas and Stokey 1983) and can be obtained
as a special case in which ζ(i) (and thus Γ(i)) equals zero.
3. THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF STORED VALUE
An optimal steady-state allocation is deﬁned by the property that no other
feasible steady-state allocation makes at least one type of household better
off without making some other type of household worse off. Two features
of the model make optimality relatively easy to assess. Even though at some
locations goods are sold for currency and at other locations goods are sold for
stored value, households at all locations face identical terms of trade between
consumption and leisure. As a result, all households at all locations will have
the same lifetime utility in any given equilibrium. We can therefore focus our
attention on the well-being of a representative household at a representative
location. Second, because the lifetime utility of any given issuer is zero in all
equilibria, we can effectively ignore the welfare of issuers when comparing
equilibrium allocations. This just reﬂects the fact that issuers receive a com-
petitive rate of return and are indifferent as to how they obtain it; constant
returns to scale in providing stored value at any location implies that issuers
earn no rents. Given these two features, we can compare alternative allocations
by considering their effect on the lifetime utility of a representative household.
For the version of this economy without stored value, the welfare eco-
nomics are well known. Households equate the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure to 1 + i rather than 1, the marginal rate of
transformation, because consumption is provided for out of currency accumu-
lated by working in the previous period, and currency holdings are implicitly
taxed at rate i. Optimality requires that the marginal rate of substitution equal
the marginal rate of transformation, which only holds if the nominal inter-
est rate is zero. A positive nominal interest rate distorts household decisions,
11 The reduced form structure in (15) and (16) is identical to Schreft (1992a) and Lacker
and Schreft (1996), although the models are somewhat different. In Schreft’s model households
use credit when close to their own home location and currency when farther away; thus at every
location shoppers from nearby use credit and shoppers from a distance use cash. In contrast, at
some locations only stored value is used and at other locations only currency is used in my model.
Also, in Schreft’s model credit costs are linear in distance.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 13
inducing substitution away from monetary activity (consumption) toward non-
monetary activity (leisure). The resulting welfare reduction is the deadweight
loss from inﬂation in this model. Intuitively, inﬂation reduces the rate of return
on currency, which causes consumers to economize on the use of currency. In a
cash-in-advance economy they can do this only by consuming less of the goods
whose purchase requires currency. The optimal monetary policy is to deﬂate
at the rate of time preference, π = β − 1, so that the nominal interest rate is
zero and the distortion in (15) is completely eliminated (Friedman 1969). Note
that in the absence of stored value, inﬂation has no effect on the feasibility
frontier (16).
I will compare two steady-state equilibria with identical inﬂation rates, one
with and one without stored value. Since the real rate is the same in all equilib-
ria, the nominal rate is constant across equilibria as well. Stored value has two
effects on a typical household’s utility. The ﬁrst is to alter the marginal rate
of substitution between monetary and nonmonetary activities. The transaction
cost associated with purchases using stored value at a given location z < ζ(i)
is γ(z), which is less than i, the private opportunity cost associated with using
currency: see Figure 1. Thus stored value reduces the average transaction cost
associated with consumption goods. This can be seen from (15), noting that the
average cost of stored value, Γ(i)/ζ(i), is less than i. Stored value reduces the
right side of (15) by the amount ζ(i)i − Γ(i), shown as the region A in Figure
1. Therefore, stored value cards reduce the distortion caused by inﬂation. By
itself, this increases welfare. Note that the lower the total cost of stored value
Γ(i), holding constant i and ζ(i), the larger the welfare gain from stored value.
The second effect is through the feasibility constraint. Stored value cards
involve real resource costs. Maintenance of the technology requires issuers’
labor time, and consumption at every location must be diverted to compen-
sate issuers for their effort. Currency requires no direct resource costs in this
model.12 The introduction of stored value shifts the consumption-leisure feasi-
bility frontier (16) inward, since resources must be diverted to cover the real
costs of stored value. The area under γ(z) from zero to ζ(i) in Figure 1 is equal
to Γ(i), the real resource costs devoted to stored value activities. In contrast,
the opportunity cost associated with currency (the area under i) is merely a
transfer payment. By itself, the resource cost of stored value reduces welfare;
a virtually costless government money is replaced by a costly private money.
Note that the larger the total cost of stored value (holding constant i and ζ(i)),
the larger the reduction in welfare.
The net effect of stored value cards on economic welfare is indeterminate
and depends on the structure of stored value costs across locations. Since we
12 See the appendix for a model with positive private costs of using currency and Lacker
(1993) for a similar model with positive government currency costs.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Opportunity Costs for Currency and













are comparing two equilibria with the same nominal interest rate, we know that
the marginal location has a cost of i. But conditions (15) and (16) tell us that
the effect depends on the shape of the cost function. The beneﬁt of stored value
in (15) varies positively with the area A in Figure 1. The detrimental effect of
stored value in (16) varies positively with Γ(i). Both effects depend solely on
Γ(i) for any given i and ζ(i). If costs are low across most locations but then rise
sharply—for example, if γ is quite convex—then Γ(i) will be relatively small.
In this case the negative effect through the feasibility condition will be small,
and the positive effect through the marginal rate of substitution, ζ(i)i − Γ(i),
will be large. If instead costs are large at most locations—for example, if γ is
quite concave—then Γ(i) is close to ζ(i)i, the resource costs will be large, and
the gain from reducing the marginal rate of substitution will be small. Thus
the greater the convexity of costs across locations, the more likely it is that
stored value cards improve economic welfare. This intuition is formalized in
the following proposition. (The proof appears in the appendix.)
Proposition 1: Fix i. Compare an economy with no stored value to an
arbitrary stored value economy with a given ratio of stored value to currency,
ζ(i)/[1 − ζ(i)]. There is a cutoff Γ∗ [which depends on i and ζ(i)] such that if
Γ(i) > Γ∗, then welfare is lower in the stored value economy, and if Γ(i) < Γ∗,
then welfare is higher in the stored value economy.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 15
The principle described in Proposition 1 appears to be quite general. In any
model in which there is a deadweight loss due to the inﬂation tax, a private
substitute for currency will reduce the base on which the tax is levied. The cost
of the substitute must be less than the tax it evades—otherwise it would not
be introduced. With the tax rate (the nominal interest rate) held constant, the
incidence of the tax is lower and so the deadweight loss associated with that
distortion will fall. Thus in any model we should expect that private substitutes
for ﬁat money help reduce the burden of a given inﬂation rate.
The negative welfare effect of stored value cards would seem to generalize
as well. Absent market imperfection, participants will adopt stored value if their
collective private beneﬁts exceed their collective private costs. But their net
beneﬁts differ from social net beneﬁts in two ways; the capture of seigniorage
is not a social beneﬁt, and they do not bear the governmental cost of currency
provision. The gap between the nominal interest rate and the government’s
per-dollar cost of providing currency thus represents the excess incentive to
implement currency substitutes.
More realistic or elaborate models would also display the principle de-
scribed in Proposition 1. For example, if stored value costs do not depend
directly on the value of messages, then the fee an issuer collects from a
merchant would be independent of the merchant’s sales.13 The relevant cost
comparison is then between the seigniorage tax, which is proportional to pro-
duction, and the ﬁxed fee, which is not. In this case the set of locations using
stored value would vary with equilibrium consumption, instead of being in-
dependent of consumption as in the model above. Nevertheless, stored value
would reduce transaction costs where it is used, and the beneﬁt of a reduced
inﬂation tax burden would have to be weighed against the added resource costs.
In the absence of stored value, inﬂation is costly in the model because
it distorts the choice between monetary and nonmonetary activities. Some
economists have suggested that an important cost of inﬂation is that it encour-
ages costly private credit arrangements as substitutes for government money
(see Ireland [1994], Dotsey and Ireland [1995], Lacker and Schreft [1996], and
Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein [1995]). Stored value could reduce this cost of
inﬂation by displacing even more costly means of payment such as checks or
credit cards. The social beneﬁt of stored value would then also include the
reduction in payments cost for some transactions. This beneﬁt would be larger,
the smaller the cost of stored value. But again, the beneﬁt of stored value would
have to be weighed against the resource cost of substituting stored value for
virtually costless currency. As long as stored value in part substitutes for cur-
rency, Proposition 1 again emerges; the lower the average cost of stored value
cards, the greater the gain from displacing more costly means of payments, and
13 The payments technologies in Ireland (1994) and English (1996) have this property.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the smaller the resources diverted to stored value systems. (A straightforward
extension of the model demonstrating this result is described in the appendix.)
As I mentioned earlier, stored value seems likely to offer consumers and
merchants greater physical convenience or some other advantages over currency
that are not captured in the model presented above. Such advantages would not
alter the basic feature of Proposition 1, however. If merchants ﬁnd stored value
less costly to handle than currency, their savings will presumably be reﬂected in
their willingness to pay stored value issuers; the social beneﬁt of stored value
to merchants will be reﬂected in issuers’ revenues. Similarly, if consumers ﬁnd
stored value more convenient than currency, they should be willing to pay,
either directly or indirectly, and the beneﬁt of stored value to consumers will
be reﬂected in issuers’ revenues. The greater convenience of stored value cards
will provide issuers with added incentive to provide stored value, but the nom-
inal interest rate (minus the government currency cost) would still constitute
a source of private return to issuing stored value that is not matched by any
social beneﬁt of replacing currency. To demonstrate this point, the appendix
describes a simple extension of the model in which there are private costs to
handling currency and shows that Proposition 1 again holds true.
What if consumers earn interest on their stored value cards, a possibility
that appears to be technologically feasible? Could this upset the conclusions of
Proposition 1? In the model, merchants earn interest on stored value balances,
although they pay some of this interest back to issuers in the form of redemp-
tion fees. Stored value yields no explicit interest for shoppers. An equivalent
scheme would be for shoppers to earn interest on stored value but face higher
prices at locations that accept stored value. The interest earnings would more
than compensate shoppers for the higher price at those locations. Stored value
would again be used at locations at which the resource cost does not exceed
the opportunity cost of using currency.
What if stored value completely displaces currency? In this case the mean-
ing of the nominal interest rate in the model becomes somewhat ambiguous;
because currency does not circulate, it might not serve as the unit of account.
Nonetheless, the difference between the real return on bonds and the real return
on stored value liabilities will not exceed the marginal cost of providing stored
value.14 Unless this difference is less than the government’s cost of providing
currency, the principle underlying Proposition 1 still applies.
Bryant and Wallace (1984) have argued that different rates of return on
different government liabilities can be justiﬁed as an optimal tax. If all sources
14 This could happen in one of two ways. Currency could remain the unit of account—a
“ghost” money. Issuers would pay interest to consumers on stored value, and issuers’ net interest
margin would not exceed the marginal cost of stored value. Alternatively, stored value could
become the unit of account, in which case the nominal interest rate would fall to the marginal
cost of stored value.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 17
of government revenue require distortionary taxation, then it may be beneﬁcial
to raise some revenues from the taxation of currency holders. This considera-
tion is not captured in the model described above. The seigniorage tax merely
ﬁnances interest payments on government bonds. The reduction in seigniorage
revenues was offset by a reduction in outstanding government debt or an in-
crease in lump-sum taxes, keeping the nominal rate constant. If instead the loss
of seigniorage had to be recovered by raising other distortionary taxes, it would
strengthen the case against stored value. The additional deadweight burden of
the compensating tax increases would have to be added to the resource cost
of stored value. Similarly, nonzero government expenditures ﬁnanced in part
through seigniorage would not change the basic features of Proposition 1.
4. POLICY
In the presence of one distortionary tax a second distortion can sometimes
improve economic welfare. A positive nominal interest rate is a distortionary
tax on holders of government currency. In the laissez-faire regime with stored
value, welfare can be lower because of the costs of stored value, which suggests
that constraints on the issue of stored value cards might be welfare-enhancing.
This turns out to be true. Restrictions on the issue of stored value can improve
welfare, in this second-best situation, by reducing the costly displacement of
government currency.15
Consider ﬁrst a simple quantitative restriction on the use of stored value.
Imagine a legal restriction that limits the quantity of stored value used by
households, or, equivalently, that limits the locations at which stored value
is accepted. Households can only make a fraction η of their purchases using
stored value, where the government sets η between 0 and ζ(i). Households
will continue to use stored value where it is most advantageous to do so—at
locations 0 through η. At locations η through 1, households use currency. Equi-
librium is still characterized as the solution to (15) and (16), except that ζ(i) is
replaced by η. For a given nominal interest rate, consumption and employment
are determined as the solutions to










Deﬁne c(η) and n(η) as the solutions to (17) and (18) for η ∈ [0,ζ(i)], and
v(η) ≡ u(c(η),1 − n(η)). The function v(η) is the equilibrium utility of a
15 This depends, of course, on ﬁnding a practical way to restrict the quantity of stored value
issued. I do not address this issue here.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
representative household under the constraint that no more than a fraction η of
purchases can be made using stored value.
Proposition 2: v0[ζ(i)] < 0; therefore there is a binding restriction η <
ζ(i) on stored value under which steady-state utility is higher than under the
laissez-faire regime.
Reducing η marginally below ζ(i) has two effects. The direct effect via the
resource constraint (18) is to eliminate the most costly uses of stored value,
allowing greater consumption at each level of employment. The increase in
utility at η = ζ(i) is proportional to γ(i). The second effect via the marginal
rate of substitution is to substitute currency (transaction cost i) for stored value
(transaction cost γ(η)). The fall in utility is proportional to i − γ(η), which
vanishes at η = ζ(i) = γ−1(i), since at the margin stored value and currency
bear the same transaction cost. The ﬁrst-order resource savings dominates the
negligible increase in the burden of inﬂation. The net effect of decreasing η
is positive. Therefore there must be a value η < ζ(i) that results in higher
steady-state utility than the laissez-faire regime. Note that Proposition 2 holds
whether or not the stored value equilibrium is worse than the no-stored-value
equilibrium; even if stored value is welfare-enhancing, quantitative constraints
would still be worthwhile.16
An alternative method of restraining stored value is to impose a reserve
requirement. Issuers are required to hold currency equal to a fraction δ of
their outstanding stored value liabilities. Issuers earn (1 − δ)i rather than i on
their assets, and the cost of foregone earnings, δi, is passed on to merchants
and ultimately to consumers. Stored value is used at fewer locations for any
given interest rate—only where γ(i) < (1−δ)i. Raising the reserve requirement
from zero reduces the amount of resources diverted to stored value. By itself
this increases utility by easing the feasibility frontier in (18). The ﬁrst-order
condition (15) becomes




(1 − δ)−1γ(z)dz, (19)
where ζ(i,δ) ≡ γ−1[(1− δ)i]. Increasing the reserve requirement now has two
effects on the marginal rate of substitution. First, raising δ expands the set of
16 Proposition 2 parallels Proposition 2 in Schreft (1992a). In Schreft’s model the government
issues no bonds and government expenditure depends on the seigniorage collected. Lowering the
constraint holding the inﬂation rate constant increases the demand for money and thus government
expenditures. Schreft’s proposition requires the condition that government expenditures rise by
less than the resource cost of payments services falls when the constraint is tightened. This
condition is unnecessary if government spending is held constant and instead the bond supply or
lump-sum taxes vary across equilibria. There are no government expenditures in my model. Note
that Proposition 2 depends crucially on the continuity of stored value costs across locations. If
there were a discrete jump in the function γ at ζ(i), then Proposition 2 might fail to hold.J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 19
locations at which currency is used instead of lower-cost stored value. This ef-
fect operates through ζ(i,δ) in (19). Second, raising δ increases the transaction
cost at all locations at which stored value is used. This effect increases the
integrand in the last term in (19) and does not vanish at δ = 0. The ﬁrst effect
is identical to the effect of decreasing the quantitative constraint η in (17). The
quantitative constraint does not involve the second effect in (19), since it leaves
inframarginal stored value users unaffected. In contrast, the reserve requirement
imposes a tax on all stored value users. Therefore, a quantitative constraint is
superior to a reserve requirement in this environment. A reserve requirement
improves welfare only if the second effect in (19) does not dominate.17
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When the nominal interest rate is positive, there is an incentive to develop
substitutes for government currency. This incentive is likely to exceed the so-
cial beneﬁt of such substitutes because the private opportunity cost of holding
currency is larger than the social cost of providing currency. Although stored
value can lower the opportunity cost of payments media for inframarginal con-
sumers, the real resources diverted to stored value are wasteful from society’s
point of view. For a given nominal interest rate, stored value cards are good
or bad for welfare depending upon whether the average cost of stored value is
below or above a certain cutoff. Quantitative restrictions on stored value can
be socially beneﬁcial, in this second-best situation, because they reduce the
amount of resources absorbed by the most costly stored value applications. I
do not claim to show that such restrictions can be easily implemented—only
that if such restrictions were practical, they would enhance welfare.
Wallace (1983) pointed out that the U.S. government has effectively pro-
hibited the private issue of paper small-denomination bearer notes such as bank
notes. In the absence of such a ban, he argued, private intermediaries could
issue perfect substitutes for government currency backed by default-free secu-
rities such as U.S. Treasury bills. In this case one of two things could occur.
Either the nominal rate of return would not exceed the marginal cost of such
intermediation, which he reckoned at close to zero, or government currency
would cease to circulate. Stored value cards are just another way of issuing
small-denomination bearer liabilities. As a corollary to Wallace’s thesis, then,
we should expect one of two things to happen. Either the nominal interest rate
will not exceed the marginal cost of an additional dollar’s worth of stored value,
or government currency will cease to circulate. All I have added to Wallace’s
17 A reserve requirement equal to 1 − γg/i could be imposed (where γg is the government
currency cost) as an experiment to determine whether the resource costs of stored value exceed
the direct beneﬁts, i.e., whether γ(z) > γg. This experiment would not answer the question posed
by Proposition 1, however.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
argument is the observation that since stored value employs a technology that is
different from, and potentially far more costly than, the government currency it
would replace, it is possible that either outcome could reduce economic welfare.
The restrictions that have prevented private paper substitutes for currency
were in place since at least the end of the Civil War. As Wallace (1986) notes,
“(i)f there is a rationale for that policy . . . then it would seem that it would
apply to other payments instruments that potentially substitute for the monetary
base.” These longstanding restrictions on paper note issue evidently have been
repealed.18 Current policy thus avoids the inconsistency of allowing electronic
substitutes for government currency while preventing paper substitutes.
APPENDIX
Government Currency Costs
The Annual Report of the Director of the Mint reports the coinage cost per
$1,000 face value for every denomination of coin, along with the number man-
ufactured. For 1993 (the latest year available) this yields a coin manufacturing
cost of $166.2 million (31.3 percent of face value). For coin operating cost the
1994 PACS Expense Report lists total cost of coin service of $14.7 million
(Board of Governors 1994b). Total government cost of coin is the sum of man-
ufacturing and operating costs, or $180.9 million. U.S. Treasury Department
Bulletin reports coin in circulation on December 31, 1993, as $20.804 billion.
For coin, therefore, the cost per dollar outstanding is $0.008695.
For currency, governmental cost for 1993 is the sum of Federal Reserve
Bank operating expenses of $123.7 million (Board of Governors 1994b), and
the Reserve Bank assessment for U.S. Treasury currency expenses of $355.9
million (Board of Governors 1994a). Total cost for currency is thus $479.6
million, or $0.001394 per dollar outstanding, based on $343.925 billion in
currency outstanding at the end of 1993 (Board of Governors 1994a).19
Combining currency and coin costs yields a total of $660.5 million for
1993. The total value of currency and coin in circulation was $36.729 bil-
lion. The total government cost of coin and currency per dollar outstanding is
therefore $0.001798.
18 Title VI of the Community Development Banking Act, P.L. 103-325 (1994), repealed all
restrictions on note issue by national banks except the 1/2 percent semi-annual tax on outstanding
notes. Section 1904(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 repealed the 10 percent tax on note issue by
corporations other than national banks. De facto restrictions by bank regulators may still prevent
private note issue.
19 For more on the government’s cost of currency, see Lacker (1993).J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 21
Proofs
Existence: Deﬁne c(y) and n(y) as the joint solutions to u1(c,1−n) = qu2(c,1−
n) and qc + (1 − n) = y. Here q is the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure, the right-hand side of (15). The assumptions on pref-
erences imply that c(y) and 1 − n(y) are unique, strictly positive for y > 0,
continuous, and monotone increasing. Assume r > 0, where r is the marginal
rate of transformation between consumption and leisure, the bracketed term in
(16). Then rc(y) + [1 − n(y)] is strictly increasing in y, there exists a unique y
such that rc(y) + [1 − n(y)] = 1, and thus n(y) = rc(y).
Proposition 1: Deﬁne c(q,r) and n(q,r) as the unique solutions to
u1(c,1 − n) = qu2(c,1 − n)
n = rc,
where attention is restricted to r ≥ 1 and q ≥ r. Deﬁne V(q,r) = u(c(q,r),1 −
n(q,r)). It is easy to show that since neither leisure nor consumption is an
inferior good, V is strictly decreasing in q and r.
The ﬁrst-best allocation has a nominal interest rate of zero, so q = r = 1.
Economies with positive nominal rates but no stored value have q = 1+i > 1
and r = 1. For given i and ζ(i),q and r vary positively with the aggregate
Γ(i). This amounts to varying average cost holding marginal cost constant at
location z = ζ(i). Note that Γ(i) can lie anywhere in the interval (0,ζ(i)i). Deﬁne
w(Γ) = V(1+(1−ζ(i))i+Γ,1+Γ). Then w(0) = V(1+(1−ζ)i,1) > V(1+i,1),
and w(ζ(i)i) = V(1 + i,1 + ζ(i)i) < V(1 + i,1). Since w(Γ) is continuous and
strictly decreasing in Γ, it follows immediately that there exists a unique Γ∗
for which w(Γ∗) = V(1 + i,1).
Proposition 2: Deﬁne q(η) as the right side of (17), and r(η) as the
bracketed term in (18). With v(η) ≡ V(q(η),r(η)), we have limη→ζ(i) v0(η) =
limη→ζ(i)[Vqq0 + Vrr0] = Vq[γ(ζ(i)) − i] + Vrγ(ζ(i)) = Vrγ(ζ(i)) < 0, since
γ(ζ(i)) = i and Vr < 0.
A Model in Which Stored Value Substitutes for
Other Means of Payment
In this section I describe a simple extension of the model in which there are
three means of payment: government currency, stored value, and another costly
private means of payment. The latter can be thought of as checks or credit cards
and is supplied by an industry with the same general properties as the stored
value sector. Locations will now be indexed by z1 and z2. Stored value costs
depend only on z1 according to γ(z1). The cost of checks depends only on z2
according to a continuous and monotone increasing function χ(z2). To simplify
the exposition, I will abstract from the effect of inﬂation on labor supply and
assume that labor is supplied inelastically: n ≡ 1 and u(c,1 − n) ≡ u(c).22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Inﬂation is inefﬁcient in this version of the model solely because it diverts
resources to the production of money substitutes. Consumption equals output
(which is ﬁxed and equal to 1) minus the resource costs of checks and stored
value. In the absence of stored value, shoppers use currency at locations where









Shoppers will use stored value at locations where γ(z1) < min[χ(z2),i]. With






where S(i) ≡ {(z1,z2) s.t. γ(z1) < MIN[i,χ(z2)]}
and C(i) ≡ {(z1,z2) s.t. χ(z2) < MIN[i,γ(z1)]}.
As in the model in the text, stored value wastes resources: at locations de-
scribed by z1 < γ−1(i) and z2 > χ−1(i), stored value costs are incurred where
formerly (costless) currency was in use. At these locations, the greater the
average cost of stored value the greater the resource diversion. However, at
locations described by z2 < χ−1(i) and γ(z1) < χ(z2), stored value substitutes
for more costly check use. In this region the resource savings is larger, the
smaller the average cost of stored value. Whether the resource savings from
displacing checks outweighs the resource cost of displacing currency depends
on the stored value cost function. It is straightforward to show that there is once
again a cutoff value; if average stored value costs are below the cutoff, stored
value is welfare-enhancing, while if average cost is greater than the cutoff,
stored value reduces welfare.
A Model with Costs of Handling Currency
This section describes an extension of the model in which handling currency
is costly to merchants and shows that Proposition 1 also holds in this extended
economy. (The same is true of an extended model in which handling currency is
costly to shoppers, but that model is omitted here.) Suppose then that accepting
currency as payment requires time-consuming effort on the part of merchants.
For convenience, I will assume that the time requirement is proportional to the





where the parameter α > 0. The feasibility condition (4) now becomes
ym
t (h) + αym
t (h) + ys
t(h) + yi
t(h) ≤ nt(h). (40)J. M. Lacker: Stored Value Cards 23
One unit of labor devoted to goods sold for currency now yields pt/(1+α) units
of currency at the beginning of period t+1. One unit of labor devoted to goods
sold to an issuer must provide the same yield, so in (5) yi
t(h) is replaced with
yi
t(h)/(1+α). In the issuer’s budget constraint, ptci
t(z) is replaced by ptci
t(z)/(1+
α). The ﬁrst-order condition from the issuer’s problem becomes





One unit of labor devoted to cash sales yields pt/(1 + α) units of currency at
t + 1. Therefore (12) becomes
pt = (1 + α)[1 − r(z)](1 + i)ps
t(z). (120)
The last two terms in the household’s budget constraint (5) now simplify to
ptnt(h)/(1 + α).
Shoppers now use stored value if and only if (1 + α)(1 + i) > [1 + γ(z)].
Deﬁne ζ(i) by (1 + α)(1 + i) = (1 + γ(ζ(i))). At this point I make a minor
modiﬁcation to the model. The preferences of issuers are altered so that goods








With this modiﬁcation, the feasibility condition for this model simpliﬁes to
n = c{(1 + α)[1 − ζ(i)] + Γ(i)}, (160)
reﬂecting the fact that both currency handling costs and stored value costs affect
the aggregate resource constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition for this model is
u1(c,1 − n)
u2(c,1 − n)
= (1 + α){1 + [1 − ζ(i)]i + Γ(i)} ≡ q. (150)
Once again the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule, but now stored
value circulates even when the nominal interest rate is zero, since in some
applications stored value is less costly than currency [γ(z) < α]. It is easy to
demonstrate that Proposition 1 holds in this economy as well: for any ﬁxed
positive nominal interest rate there exists a cutoff Γ∗ such that the stored value
economy Pareto-dominates the economy without stored value if and only if
Γ(i) < Γ∗.
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